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TOPICAL SURVEY
B. Restrictive Business Practices and
Competition
ANTITRUST - ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT - U.S.
COURTS WILL NOT APPLY § 2(a) OF THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT TO GOODS PURCHASED IN THE U.S.
FOR RESALE ABROAD
Fimex Corp. v. Barmatic Products Co., 429 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. N.Y.), aff'd
mem., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977).
On November 4, 1976, Fimex Corp. filed a complaint against
Barmatic Products Co. alleging that Barmatic practiced price discrimina-
tion in violation of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act (hereinafter
referred to as the Act).1 The defendant manufactures auto parts which it
sells to middlemen such as the plaintiff for resale in the United States
and abroad. Over a period of years the plaintiff had purchased many auto
parts from several manufacturers which it in turn resold both in the
United States and abroad. The unrefuted testimony of the defendant
indicated that all the parts which it had sold to the plaintiff had been
resold abroad. Upon motion by the defendant, summary judgment was
granted on the basis that a transaction wherein the goods are sold for
resale abroad does not come within the purview of the Act. In so doing
this court became the first judicial body to make a clear statement
concerning the role which this section of the Act is to play in the arena of
international trade.
Section 2(a) of the Act prohibits among other things, price discrimina-
tion between purchasers of like commodities "where such commodities are
sold for use, consumption, or resale within the U.S. '2 The first question
the court faced was the problem of rendering a proper interpretation of
that specific phrase.3
It was plaintiff's contention that the phrase should be construed to
cover the sale of goods to purchasers within the United States for use,
consumption or resale. The fact that the purchaser in the United States
then exports these goods was claimed to be totally irrelevant and to have
no effect on the rights of the United States purchaser under Section 2(a)
1. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13-13(b), 21(a) (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
3. The court admitted that this was not to be an easy task and quoted the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Automatic Canteen Co. v. F.T.C., 346 U.S. 61 (1953)
wherein the Court noted that "precision of expression is not an outstanding
characteristic of the Act." Id. at 65.
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of the Act. The plaintiffs interpretation rests on what could be termed a
"location" theory, which postulates that the key consideration in
potential price discrimination cases is the location of the two sales (and,
of course, the two purchasers) which are alleged to involve discriminatory
prices.
The court rejected plaintiffs contention and adopted the contrary
theory which could be termed a "destination" theory. According to that
theory in alleged instances of price discrimination the key is determining
where the goods are going and not where the parties are located. To
support its analysis the court relied heavily on the writings of
Congressman Patman which were published after, the enactment of the
law. 4 The court also based its decision on a rather dissimilar case which
arose in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
5
In that case a foreign manufacturer charged one price for American
purchasers and another for Japanese purchasers. The court found that no
action could be brought against that manufacturer because there was no
discriminatory pricing between different American consumers and no
goods which were sold to Japanese purchasers were sold "for use,
consumption or resale in the U.S. '
'6
Having determined that a "destination" rule is the proper rule under
the Act, the court attempted to fashion a test for deciding the factual
question of when goods were "sold for . . . resale within the United
States." 7 The court admitted that this issue could be viewed from three
entirely different perspectives. This arises from the fact that in any given
transaction there exists the seller's beliefs and expectations, the buyer's
beliefs and expectations and the actual conclusion of the transaction. The
court, therefore, stated that there were three possible tests which could be
used. These were: (a) the seller's intent; (b) the buyer's intent; and (c) the
place where the goods were actually resold.8
On the particular facts of this case all three tests yield the same
result. The buyer intended to sell the goods abroad, the seller believed the
goods were going to be resold abroad and the goods were in fact resold
abroad. Therefore, the small discussion which the court allocated to the
relative merits of the three tests is obiter dicta in that no differentiation
between the three was necessary to reach the conclusion which the court
4. 429 F. Supp. 979 quoting from L. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
208 (1938).
5. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp.
244 (E.D. Pa.), petition denied, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).
6. 402 F. Supp. at 248.
7. 429 F. Supp. at 980.
8. Id.
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reached. Given the likelihood, however, (recognized by this court) that
similar cases will arise in the future, it is important to briefly examine the
court's analysis, not only of the three tests, but also of the proper
interpretation to be given the Act itself.
At the outset it should be noted that this article will not attempt a
lengthy discussion of the proper interpretation to be given the phrase
"sold for . . resale within the United States." As mentioned earlier, two
radically different theories, the location and the destination, currently
exist in this area.9 A major flaw in this decision is the court's failure to
discuss several U.S. Supreme Court decisions which imply that the Act's
purpose is to promote competition and protect smaller purchasers for the
sake of competition, and that therefore, it is the location of the
competitors and not the destination of the goods which should control.10
Assuming, arguendo, that the court was correct in its interpretation,
it is still necessary to review the three possible tests for answering the
factual question of what determines whether goods are sold for resale
within the United States.
The purpose of the Act should ultimately determine which of the three
tests is appropriate. The fact that treble damages are provided clearly
indicates that the Act is intended to discourage price discrimination
rather than to merely compensate the victims of such a practice.
Therefore the proper test should be the one which provides the maximum
deterrent effect.
The test which provides the maximum protection is the one labeled
"buyer's intent." Under that test if the buyer planned to resell the goods
in the United States at the time he purchased them then the transaction
would be protected by the Act. Utilization of this test would satisfy two
important objectives. First, it would insure that every purchaser who
would like to resell goods in the United States, be charged a price which
allows him to compete with every other similarly situated purchaser.
Indeed one of the contentions of Fimex, the purchaser in this case, was
that it could never obtain a contract to resell goods in the United States
because it was forced to pay Barmatic discriminatorily high prices. The
second goal which use of this test would help to achieve is somewhat
9. Surprisingly, few authors even discuss this question. Of seven works
surveyed only two mention the issue. One favors a destination interpretation. See
H. SHNIDERMAN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN PERSPECTIVE 8 (1977). The other
indicates that only sales to foreign purchasers are exempt. See F. RowE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 81-82 (1962). Obviously,
more discussion is needed here.
10. F.T.C. v. Simplicity Patterns Co., 360 U.S. 55, 62, 69 (1959); F.T.C. v.
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 541 (1960).
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evidentiary in nature, but is nevertheless extremely critical to fulfillment
of the Act's intention. To prevail in a Robinson-Patman action a buyer
would only be required to show that he was charged unjustified
discriminatory prices for goods - a like kind and quality of which are
sold in interstate commerce - and that he had planned to resell them in
the United States. Neither of the other two tests provide an equal degree
of protection for buyers. The "objective test" would require that the goods
in question actually be resold in the United States. Consequently in
situations where a buyer is prevented from reselling goods within the
United States solely because he is charged discriminatorily high prices,
he would fail in his Robinson-Patman action even though the Act was
clearly intended to cover such a situation. Similarly if the "seller's intent"
test were used a buyer would lose his case if he were unable to prove that
the seller knew that the goods were to be resold in the United States even
if the goods were in fact resold there. Again, such a result is not intended
by the Act.
Despite the fact that use of the "buyer's intent" test would go the
furthest in promoting the objectives of the Act, the court in Fimex stated
that such a test should not be read into the act because it was "unfair." 11
The court reached this conclusion by reasoning that use of this test would
create a trap for the unwary seller.1 2 This apprehension is largely
unwarranted. Use of this test would merely force the seller to ascertain
the buyer's intent prior to completing the transaction. Such a requirement
is not excessively demanding and actually fits within the overall
operation of the Act. Moreover, use of this test would still require that
complainant buyers prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they
did in fact intend to resell the goods within the United States.
The circumstances in Fimex v. Barmatic did not warrant a lengthy
analysis of the three possible tests which could be used to determine when
goods are sold "for use, consumption or resale within the United States."
The case is important, however, in that it illuminates the issues which
exist in this area. The separate but related issue of whether a location or
destination theory is appropriate also merits substantial, future discus-
sion.
For the purposes of this short article it is sufficient to point out that
the destination theory, opted for in this case, could lead to results which
were clearly unintended by the Act. This can be illustrated in the
following way. Under the destination theory an American wholesaler
11. 429 F. Supp. at 981.
12. Id.
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would not be protected by the Act when he purchases goods from an
American producer for resale abroad, but at the same time a foreign
wholesaler or other purchaser would be protected by the Act when he
purchases goods from an American producer for resale in the United
States. Utilization of the location theory would lead to the opposite, and
in the opinion of this writer, appropriate result.13
Both issues - the proper theory and the proper test to be applied
given a particular theory - are important to American businesses. It is
hoped that future decisions will thoroughly discuss these issues in light of
the intentions and purposes of the Act.
David Salem
13. An analysis of this issue requires a determination of who the intended
beneficiaries of the Act are, consumers or competitors and whether the Act was
designed to promote competition or provide for similar prices for similar gbods.
Such a determination would necessarily involve a discussion of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
